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 POLITICS
The Waxman Cometh
But he doth not succeed
MARK HEMINGWAY
Considering that Time magazine once described Henry Waxman as having “all the panache of your parents’ dentist,” it’s hard to imagine how he became the most feared member of Congress. The Californian is serving his 17th consecutive term, representing one of the country’s safest Democratic districts (it includes West Hollywood and Beverly Hills). While other congressmen have sometimes been distracted by the business of reelection, Waxman has had the luxury of indulging his obsessive focus as a partisan legislator. Waxman admits he has no hobbies and rarely reads anything unrelated to politics; he’s even had to publicly defend, in the pages of the Washington Post, the assertion that he has a sense of humor.
Waxman is that rare American politician who resides far to the left of the mainstream, but is also remarkably effective. He has been relentless in enacting his agenda — that of (in his words) a “proud, self-confessed, unapologetic liberal.” His numerous successes include expanding Medicaid, clearing the way for litigation against the tobacco industry, and co-authoring the Clean Air Act. He is a notably zealous partisan.
So when the Democrats took back Congress in 2006, it was not the leadership of Harry Reid or Nancy Pelosi that struck fear in the hearts of Republicans. It was, rather, Waxman’s takeover of the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform that was (in the Washington Post’s characterization) “the Bush administration’s worst nightmare.”
The chairman of that committee is the only person in Congress who has unilateral power to issue subpoenas without a committee vote. And the panel’s purview is nearly limitless: If something has a potential impact on federal policy, Waxman can call hearings and investigate it. He is known for his brutal and relentless questioning style. Once he has ensnared his prey. he requires witnesses to testify under oath so that, if there’s even a whiff of imperfect recollection, his staff — which features some of the most dogged and experienced operatives on Capitol Hill — is likely to sniff it out, exposing witnesses to perjury charges.
As the first year of the first Democratic-controlled Congress in twelve years comes to a close, Democrats are busy pointing fingers for their notable failures. Funding for the war is still intact; the Democrats’ ambitious reform agenda has been stymied; the leadership has been unable to pass even basic appropriations bills in a timely fashion. But while Democrats are angry at Pelosi and Reid, few seem to have taken note of the fact that Waxman’s committee has been a bust as well. Given his fearsome reputation, expectations were high that he could use his position to hold Republicans’ feet to the fire. Yet even with virtually unchecked power, Waxman was able to do little more than generate splashy press coverage and badger the administration, with meager results.
SHOW TRIALS
Waxman accomplished little, but his endless parade of hearings did prove to be a significant nuisance. Ironically enough, Republicans are themselves to blame for Waxman’s immense power: The unilateral-subpoena authority was created by a rules change made after Republicans took over in 1994, and the Government Reform Committee was tasked with investigating the hydra-headed Clinton scandals. Former chairman Dan Burton used his authority to issue over 1,000 subpoenas; to some extent, this bold exercise of power was needed to do an end-around on Waxman, who as ranking Democrat fought tenaciously to defend the Clinton presidency. Waxman’s defense of Clinton is now the stuff of legend. He famously staged a Democratic walkout from another House committee that had prepared a damaging report on the Travelgate scandal, storming out and bellowing, “I leave this committee with absolute disgust for it and its chairman!”
His work in the Government Reform Committee was equally dramatic. In one typical episode during the John Huang fundraising scandal (as recounted in The Weekly Standard), two Waxman staffers tried to undermine the credibility of one David Wang, an associate of Huang who was testifying against him. Waxman’s staffers tired to get Wang’s father — an old Chinese immigrant with a limited command of English — to sign a statement contradicting his son’s testimony. Wang’s father refused to sign the statement. Instead of being embarrassed by his staffers’ aggressive tactics, Waxman distributed a statement shortly afterward repeating the claim that Wang’s father had contradicted his son’s testimony — despite the fact that Wang’s father had already publicly refuted Waxman’s claims.
Waxman appeared untroubled by these tactics, but nonetheless cried foul every time Burton so much as lifted a finger to pry into allegations against the Clintons. In one letter he sent Burton, he complained that Burton’s investigators had committed the crime of knocking “loudly and persistently” on the door of a potential witness. In another instance, Waxman distributed a letter containing a text labeled “suggested procedure for beginning investigative interviews” that he insisted investigators read before interviewing any potential witnesses. It read like Miranda rights on steroids, clearly designed to prevent witnesses from cooperating:
As a potential witness, we would like to ask you some questions. It is your choice whether to speak with us or not to speak with us. You have every right not to speak with us. If you choose to speak with us, we must advise you of several facts. First, it is important to be truthful, because it is a federal crime for you to make false statements to a government official. Second, you may terminate the interview at any time or decline to answer some questions and still answer other questions. Third, in the future, you may be called as a witness to testify in a televised public hearing. You have the right to speak with a lawyer before you speak with us. You also have the right to have a lawyer present during questioning if you wish. Waxman proved an incredibly effective firewall for the Clintons. But while he could play good defense while in the minority, he was stymied at every turn when he tried to go on offense after George W. Bush entered the White House. In 2001, Waxman’s partisanship got the better of him. Since the minority on his committee lacked the ability to instigate their own hearings, he was responsible for prodding the General Accounting Office — Congress’s auditing arm — to file a lawsuit about the influence energy companies had on Bush-administration policy. This tactic was remarkably aggressive; in 2002, a federal judge ruled that a congressional agency such as the GAO didn’t have the legal standing to file such a lawsuit, and — even more surprising — the GAO did not appeal the decision.
In 2006, Waxman was licking his chops at the prospect of taking over the chairmanship. “I suppose some people have had a free ride for the last six years,” he told U.S. News.
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